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Abstract 
The case of ILVA steel works in Taranto, Italy demonstrates the potential impacts associated with failing 
toadequately consider environmental and social sustainability issues within the business model of the firm. This 
paper provides a review of the situation at ILVA today; the decisions and actions that contributed to the current 
situation since privatisation of the firm in 1995; and the choices now facing government, the local community, 
and the firm’s owners going forward including a review of Best Available Techniques (BATs). The review is 
supported with relevant sustainability literature and explores how a more comprehensive assessment of 
sustainability considerations might be better integrated into business model evolution. The paper demonstrates 
that an inappropriate technology investment strategy that fails to consider broader concepts of value for the 
society and environment does not pay in the long-term, and that expectations of government support to mitigate 
negative impacts of business are becoming increasingly untenable.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
ILVA Taranto, Italy’s leading steel producer made headline 
news across the world after being sequestered on the 26th of 
July 2012 by Taranto’s regional PHJ(Preliminary Hearing 
Judge). ILVA was accused of creating an unprecedented 
environmental disaster; due to this, the PHJwanted ILVA to 
shut down theirblast furnaces and to encloseuncovered 
mineral stockpiles. The Judicial review court stated on the 6th 
of August 2012 thatthe ILVA disaster over the years 
isattributed to constant and repeated polluting activity 
perpetrated wilfullyby the owners and managers. In particular, 
the ILVA operating practices were such that they produced a 
malicious disaster through actions and omissions with a high 
potential for destructive outcomes for the environment (and 
society).The protracted action to force changes at ILVA 
Taranto was notable not just for the environmental violations 
and related health issues, but also for the strong counter-
arguments presented by the labour trade union and the local 
community for continuing production in order to protect their 
employment, and the political activities to find a financing 
solution for the necessary improvements. The complexity of 
the situation, the economical, environmental and social trade-
offs under discussion and the large set of stakeholders 
involved make the ILVA case a particularly interesting 
scenario for the discussion of sustainable business models[1]. 
This paper reviews the current situation at ILVA in terms of 
economic, social and environmental impacts, and explores 
the options available to ILVA and the Italian Government for 
improving/restoring the situation. The aim of this paper is to 
suggest that a more comprehensive assessment of 
sustainability considerations might be better integrated into 
business model evolution in order to avoid complex situations 
like the one reported. 
The considered industrial case (steel) is of 
particularinterestwith respect to the concept of industrial 
sustainability [2]. All three TripleBottom Line 
(TBL)sustainability dimensions (environmental, social, and 
economic)are included,with apparent strong conflict between 
each dimension. Technology (afourthdimension from an 
industrialperspective) is also included as in this case it is 
crucial to determine and influence the first three dimensions. 
Asustainability value mapping tool[3]can be used to assess 
the various forms of value and conflicting demands of the key 
stakeholder groupsas illustrated in Table 1. 
The sustainability problem can be categorised as: 
 Environmental:Assuming that the current level of 
pollution is the cause of health problems and disease in 
the region, is it possible to mitigate and fix this issue 
through selective and incremental interventions to 
improve the health and conditions of workers and 
surrounding populationwhile still preserving employment? 
 Social:What is the social cost of a potential definitive 
closure or liquidation of ILVA Tarantoon the direct/indirect 
worker population (approximately 19,000 employees), 
and more broadlyon the related plants in other parts of 
Italy (Genova and Novi)? How can this be balanced with 
long-term health issues in the region? 
 Economic:Can ILVA Taranto (Riva Group) afford the 
investments necessary to improve and upgrade the 
plant(s) in order to reach the required standards as 
suggested by BATs and related Reference Documents 
(BRefs) [4]? And if not, could the Government supply 
resources for these investments by applying several 
conditions and constraints to the ownership? 
 Technological: are the BATs suggested in the AIA 
(integrated environmental authorisation) directive 
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[5]issued by the regional government really effective for 
the specific case and how is the best way to implement 
them? 
Table 1: Value mapping analysis 
Stakeholder 
group 
Value 
currently 
captured 
Value 
destroyed or 
missed 
New Value 
opportunity 
Value chain 
actors incl. 
investors, 
suppliers, 
etc. 
(Economicval
ue) 
Profit 
maximisation; 
Long-term 
relationships 
with 
suppliers;Loca
lised 
operations 
Reduced 
outputand 
potential 
stoppage; 
Reduced 
profitability/ 
market share 
Investment in 
technology to 
conform to EU 
standards to 
boostproductiv
ity and growth 
Customers 
(Use value) 
Price, product 
quality, supply 
lead-time 
Reduced 
supplies and 
potential need 
to search for 
alternative 
steel producer 
Switch to 
alternative 
non-Italian 
producer 
Environment 
(Ecological 
Value) 
Partial capture 
and 
containment 
of emissions 
and pollutants 
Pollution; Loss 
of biodiversity; 
Reduced food 
production in 
region 
Reduce 
emissions and 
pollution with 
technology; 
Contribute to 
clean up of 
contamination 
Society 
(Societal 
Value) 
Jobs (12,000 
direct + 7,000 
indirect in 
supply chain); 
Multiplier 
effect on 
regional 
economic 
activity and 
taxbase 
Health risk 
and long-term 
care 
costs(respirat
ory disease, 
cancers); 
Job losses of 
forced 
layoffs;Agricult
ural 
contamination  
Enhance living 
conditions for 
community; 
Safe jobs; Job 
creation; 
Reduce 
healthcare 
burden; 
Regenerate 
farming sector 
 
2 BACKGROUND TO CASE 
Italy is the second largest manufacturing nation in Europe  
with major strength in mechanics, machine tools, steel, 
chemical-pharmaceutical and rubber-plastics industries, foods 
and textile and clothing industry. However, the country is now 
in its longest recession in 20 years, and has languished in 
more than a decade of almost non-existent growth. 
Unemployment is at more than 11%; for under-25s it is more 
than 36%. Italy also has the second highest ratio of sovereign 
debt to GDP in the EU imposing severe austerity measures 
on the nation. Reinvigoration of the industrial sector to 
stimulate economic growth and employment is a major focus 
of policy makers.  
Concerning environmental sustainability Italy is subject to EU 
regulations on emissions and pollutions. However, the 
judiciary system is slow-moving and sometimes alarmingly 
politicisedhence implementation and enforcement of 
environmental legislation has often been weak or none-
existent. This is compounded by frequent changes in the 
political system that undermines continuity, and a significant 
level of crime and corruption within the country. 
Within this context, the subject of this case study is the ILVA 
steel production plant in Taranto in the region of Puglia, 
Southern Italy (biggest steel production plant in Europe). ILVA 
is a joint stock company owned by the Riva Group, which is 
mainly based on the production and processing of steel. ILVA 
was previously the State-owned company IRI acquired bythe 
Riva family in the early 1990’s. The group now consists of 42 
plants operating in 8 countries across the world. Based on 
2011 data the Riva group is the outright leader in Italy, the 3rd 
largest steel producer in Europe, and the 21st in the world by 
production volume. 
The steel production process of a plant such as ILVA Taranto, 
and the process inputs and outputs including emissions and 
potential pollutants at each stageare illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Typical steel production process 
(Source: adapted from [4]) 
 
The operating equipment and facilities at ILVA Taranto 
integrated steel works consist of: 
Hot area 
 10 Coke oven batteries 
 2 Agglomeration plants 
 5 Blast furnaces 
 2 LD steel works (each equipped with 3 converters of 
330t. and 350t. respectively) 
 5 Continuous Casting machines (2 strands) for slabs 
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Rolling mill 
 2 Hot rolling mills for coils 
 1 Hydrochloric pickling line 
 1 Coupled pickling tandem rolling line 
 1 Electro galvanizing line 
 1 Hot-dip galvanizing line 
 1 Batch annealing line with 54 furnaces and 125 bases 
 2 Tandem skin pass mills Finishing and cutting lines 
 1 Heavy plates (2 stands) quarto reversing mill 
Pipe mill 
 1 Longitudinally ERW pipes plant 
 2 Longitudinally SAW pipes plant 
 6 Pipe external coating and internal lining plants 
 1 External coating weighing down with concrete line 
 
From the environmental point of view, the main polluting 
elements are PM10 (Particulate Matter smaller than 10 
micrometres that are capable of penetrating deep into the 
respiratory tract and causing significant health damage), 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in particular the 
benzo(a)pyrene,dioxinsand heavy metals that can be 
carcinogenic. Stages of the production process that are 
considered particularly polluting are the mineral parks 
(storage areas for minerals used in steel production), the coke 
ovens,blast furnaces, and the agglomeration (sintering) plant. 
 
3 CURRENT SITUATION AT ILVA 
3.1 Economic situation 
In 2011, Riva Group produced 16 Mt of raw steel, of which, 
7.6 Mt of black coils, 4.1 Mt of wire rod, 2.0 Mt of concrete 
reinforcing steel (rebar), 1.0 Mt of rolled bars and billets, and 
0.8 Mt of quarto plates. This equated to a turnover of about 
10B€, with a reported net profit of 327.3 M€. This represented 
a return to profitability after poor performance in 2009 with 
turnover of 5.822B€(with a reported loss of 547.7 M€), and 
2010 with 7.788B€(and a loss of 66.3 M€)[6]. The ILVA 
Taranto plant produces 8 Mt of steel annually, and distributes 
value of 865 M€ into the Taranto region; this represented 
about 75% of Taranto’s GDP based on the Bank of Italy 
reports in 2008. 
In the last 15 years the Riva Group has reportedly invested 
about 4.4B€ in the steel making plant. ILVA report that 25% of 
thishas been for environmental and safety enhancement, 
although it is not possible to clearly delineate between these 
investments and other forms of plant investment. About half of 
the investment on environmental and safety 
enhancements(447.3 M€) were reportedly for improvements 
to the coke oven, but it seems littlewas invested in the mineral 
parks coverage or more effective dust reduction measures; 
only recentlyhas ILVA begun to invest in the coverage of the 
conveyors.ILVA claim that higher rates of investment on 
environmental performance were not financially feasible. 
However, despite the reported losses at ILVA Taranto, the 
Riva Group had positive profits as discussed above, and the 
net asset equity of Riva Group is on an upward trend 
(currently around 4 B€), so financing of plant improvements 
appears possible, albeit perhaps not desirable to the owners 
and investors. 
In July 2012, the Taranto judiciary ordered the shutdown of 
the plant’s smelters in an attempt to force the Riva group to 
initiate the necessary investments. Facing inaction from ILVA, 
in November 2012 the Taranto judiciary took the extreme 
action of seizing 800 M€ of finished product in an attempt to 
force change. This action was overturned by a government 
decree to allow the plant to continue operating to protect jobs, 
but the dispute is still on-going. 
3.2 Environmental issues 
In 2010, ILVA emitted over 4,000t of dust, 11,000t of nitrogen 
dioxide, 11,300t of sulphur dioxide, 7.0t of hydrochloric acid, 
1.3t of benzene, 150kg of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
(PAH), 52.5g of benzo(a)pyrene, 14.9gof organic compounds, 
polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans 
(PCDD/F) and dioxin PCBdl. Levels of PCDD/F and PCBdl 
may be traced to specific sintering activities (agglomeration 
area) carried out within the plant. 
To reduce emissions it is necessary to take measures 
forcontainment giving priority to the reduction of emissions of 
hazardous substances and metals. At present, ILVAhas 
largedeposits of coal,coke and other mineralsadjacent to the 
production plantin 30m high stockpiles. These are exposed 
tothe weather andparticularly duringdry south-easterly wind 
conditions dispersefine dust particles across the city creating 
values of PM10 beyond acceptable levels. The only method 
currently used for retaining this dust is to humidify the 
deposits using trucks that spray water over the stockpiles. 
Even though ILVA’s certifications say they respected national 
laws and regional values (as measured in 2010), experts 
have pointed out that to achieve the emissions targets 
introduced in 1999 the humidification system would have 
requiredcontinuous automatic control to activate when 
conditions demanded. There was no such control, and without 
this the emissions cannot be considered compliant. 
Emissions from other parts of the production process are 
similarly problematic. In accordance with European 
Community rules on the environmental performance ofsteel 
plant experts have found that: “in most of the production 
areas and/or process steps, the amount of the pollutants 
emitted are considerably higher than those that would be 
emitted in the case of adoption by ILVA of BATs with the 
performance as determined by BRefs“. Furthermore, experts 
have concluded that if BATs were adopted for all phases of 
production, and not only discrete parts of the process, this 
would be more efficient in reducing pollutants and thus reduce 
emission loads from the entire plant. The difference found 
between the measured values and those expected from the 
application of BAT and those reported in BRef, shows that 
there is still a gap between the techniques used in ILVA and 
their effectiveness. 
3.3 Social issues 
Evidencesuggests that the environmental contamination has 
in turn created serious health problemsfor the employees and 
the wider Taranto community over the past decade[7]. The 
current enquiry into the site was launched after a 30% overall 
spike in local cancer rates was reported, with liver cancer up 
by 75% and upper uterine cancer up by 80%. Analysis of 
specific disease data provided by the Ministry of Health 
shows that while the cancer ratesfor the average Italian 
population are decreasing and the same phenomenon can be 
observed in the Puglia region, in Taranto cancer related 
deaths have been increasing.For example, in the period 
2001-2008 lung cancer deaths in Taranto have increased by 
5%, while the Italian average has decreased by 
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10%[8].Incidences of respiratory problems such as asthma 
are also reportedly higher in the area, with 90% of all babies 
affected. 
Pollution also impactson quality of life in the Taranto 
community in other ways through contamination of land and 
water sourcesand the consequent risk of affecting the food 
chain. Residents are advised not to grow crops or raise 
livestock in the area (In 2008 roughly 2,000 sheep were 
slaughtered after their milk and meat were found to contain 
dangerous levels of dioxins). Furthermore,the city mayor has 
issued an instruction that children should not play in unpaved 
lotsto avoid contact with the omnipresent red and black dust 
particles that regularly blanket the city. 
Countering the health concerns are the social benefits of 
long-term employment. ILVA Taranto employs more than 
12,000 direct workers and 7,000 indirect workers, and is 
responsible for 75% of the 50Btof traffic handled by the 
Taranto port. Moreover the plant feeds ILVA’sGenova plant 
(1,760 workers), Novi plant (just under 1,000 workers), 
Racconigi’s plant (200 workers) and other small plants. Due 
to the consequences of legal actions on the 26th of November 
2012, the cold area production of the plant was stopped with 
an immediate potential layoff for 5,000 employees. 
Furthermore, the Puglia regionthat includes Taranto already 
suffers from unemployment levels of 25%, andILVA is relied 
upon as one of the main opportunities for stable employment. 
So Taranto is facing a complex double problem –the 
population is worried about serious disease and other health 
issues caused by pollution, while at the same time employees 
and their dependents, and local suppliers and businesses are 
afraid to lose their jobs. Large strikes were organised in the 
latter half of 2012 in Taranto and in other cities where ILVA 
undertakes secondary processing, and the position of the 
workers (supported by the Unions) is to defend their jobs. 
 
4 BEST AVAILABLE TECHNIQUES (BATS) 
The technological performance of the ILVA’s plant process 
has been analysed in the light of known BATs&BRefs[4], in 
order to identify available technologies to tackle each aspect 
of the firm’s production processes and emissions.Particular 
attention is paid to the following areas: mineral parks (Table 
2), coke oven (Table 3), sintering (Table 4), and blast furnace 
(Table 5). For each area the tables providethe current 
situation and technology employed by ILVA along with 
suggested BATs. 
 
Table 2: Mineral parks BATs analysis 
ILVA ILVA PLANNED 
INVESTMENTS 
GOVERNMENT 
REQUEST 
Humidification 
of the deposits 
through the use 
of water 
cannon trucks 
Construction of 2.2 km, 
21 m high, barrier in High 
Density Polyethylene 
(HDPE); 20% reduction 
of the average inventory; 
Increase humidification of 
road and materials with 
fog cannons; 
Implementation of a 
monitoring system for 
humidification. 
To cover all the 
mineral parks 
(Potential 
solution as used 
only by Hyundai 
in South Korea) 
 
Table 3: Coke oven BATs analysis 
PROCESS 
PHASE 
ILVA (in 
progress) 
BAT EU 
Coal 
preparation 
Secondary de-
dusting 
Techniques for minimising 
emissions 
Oven 
charging 
“Smokeless” 
charging 
machine 
Preventingoven charging 
emissions 
Coking 
Coke ovens 
refractory partial 
revamping  
Stabilise operation; 
Coke ovens maintenance; 
Sealing of emissions points; 
NOx reduction; 
Pressure regulation of ovens;  
Improvement and cleaning of 
oven doors 
Pushing of 
the coke 
Fume capturing 
at coke 
discharging 
Techniques for minimising 
emissions 
Coke 
quenching 
Conventional 
wet quenching 
Improvement of coke wet 
quenching; 
Coke dry quenching 
Treatment of 
coke oven 
gas 
Desulphurisation 
Reducing the number of 
flanges; 
Usinggas-tight pumps; 
Avoiding emissions from 
pressure valves; 
Desulphurisation  
Coke 
handling 
Secondary de-
dusting 
Using enclosures; 
Efficient extraction and de-
dusting 
 
Table 4: Sintering BATs analysis 
PROCESS 
PHASE 
ILVA (in 
progress) BAT EU 
Raw 
materials 
preparation 
Secondary de-
dusting; 
Control of oil in 
sinter feed 
Abatement of dust emissions; 
Control of residues 
characteristics used in sinter 
feed; 
Reduction of VOC emissions 
Sintering 
MEEP (Moving 
Electrode 
Electrostatic 
Precipitator); 
Active carbon & 
urea injection; 
NOx and SO2 
monitoring 
Process optimisation; 
Advanced electrostatic 
precipitator; 
Bag filter with injection of 
active carbon and other 
additives; 
Reduction of NOx and SO2 
Cooling and 
processing 
sinter 
Secondary de-
dusting 
Abatement of dust emissions 
from secondary sources 
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Table 5: Blast furnace BATs analysis 
PROCESS 
PHASE 
ILVA (in 
progress) 
BAT EU 
Loading 
material 
Stock-house de-
dusting 
Minimising stock-house 
emissions 
Reduction 
and smelting 
Venturi 
scrubbers blast 
furnace gas 
Techniques for reducing dust 
emissions of blast furnace 
gas  
Casting iron 
and slag 
Cast-house de-
dusting; 
Tar-free runner 
linings 
Minimising cast-house 
emissions; 
Fume suppression during hot 
metal charging (with N2); 
Using tar-free runner linings 
Slag 
treatment 
Condensation of 
fume from slag 
processing 
(partial) 
Condensation of fume from 
slag processing 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
While finalizing this paper interventions will start in order to 
cover the mineral parks (36 months foreseen) as well as other 
plant improvements. Extraordinary government funded job 
protection measures will be activated for 6,417 workers of 
Taranto’s plant until 2015. The job protection measures will 
mitigate the social impact to implement the Integrated 
Environmental Authorisation (AIA) even if they will be charged 
on collectivist base in an already challengingeconomic 
situation for Italy. Solidarity agreements could also be added 
in this case impacting on workers salary. Notwithstanding 
these measures, the situation within the Taranto plant is still 
critical and one head of department has recently been 
threatened with death. 
The ILVA activity is under examination by technicians sent by 
the Minister in the area of environmental protection and 
concerning the law 231 of 2012 (see www.ispraambiente.it). 
The goal is to enableopen consultation of given 
prescriptionsto verify the implementation of the AIA plan. To 
this concern, the last report (28th of February 2013) proposed 
about 12 months of work to coverthe mineral parks according 
to technologiesidentified in the BATs analysis – new fog 
cannons and a monitoring system will include safety flares 
and six new sensors along the external perimeter of the plant. 
Within June 2013, 25 new measurement systems for 
emissions will be installed monitoring the following areas: 
agglomerate (sintering), coke oven, blast furnace and 
steelmaking milling. Concerning the continuous sampling of 
dioxin a system has already been installed andmonitoring 
protocolare being defined by the environmental agencies.  
The coke areas (860 M€ of interventions of the nearly 2B€ 
estimated), will be improved starting from coke oven 
batterynumber 9,and completed within the second half of 
2013, while batteries 3, 4, 5 and 6, have already been shut 
down and will be rebuilt together with battery 11. For the 
agglomerate, purchase orders have been placed for textile 
filters (see the BATs). Also, the blast furnace area will be 
improved within 18-24 months. In steel makingfacility 1 the 
roof floor will be closed and connected to fumes and dust 
aspiration systems, works have already been undertaken for 
2 of 3 converters, and completion is expected for June 2013. 
Further, ILVA has launched the purchase order for a new 
textile filter (3.2 million cubic meters per hour). Finally, the raw 
material conveyor belts will be covered (385 belts for 200 km), 
90%of which will be covered within 2014.  
But what is the cost of so many interventions as requested by 
the AIA plan released the 26th of October 2012? The initial 
estimation was around 3B€to 4B€. This is a significant 
amount but still far from the original estimation made in the 
September judicial review that put the cost close to 10 B€for 
upgrade of the hot plant area. Surprisingly, the most recent 
estimateundertaken (Siderweb Study Centre) suggests of 
cost of approximately 1.5 B€. If confirmed it will remove any 
doubt about the economic feasibility of the plan and so 
remove the threat of such investments undermining the future 
survival of the enterprise. However, immediately after this 
statement, ILVA presented a plan costing 2.25 B€. 
Thus the lesson learned is that combining environmental, 
social, economic, and technical problems together results in 
the most disparate estimations and that the estimation 
process is strongly opaque, especially in this specific case. 
But this apparent unclearness has, in our opinion, other 
possible reasons. The AIA released by the Minister defines 
and prescribes the company to reduce pollution by applying 
the BATs. However, the company, by law, takes the final 
decision on what to apply in the light of economic feasibility. 
Particularly, the assessment included in the AIA (article 8, law 
decree 59/2005), considers the best technologies in an 
absolute way and not with respect to a cost-benefit criteria. 
The cost reduction proposed by ILVA, against the first 
ministerial estimation, is justified by the fact in September the 
estimation process was done only in an approximate way. 
Now feasibility and design quantification are in the operative 
phase and only 20% variability is acceptable before closing all 
the contracts for consequent activities.  
Another important issue concerns the reliability and reality of 
the interventions undertaken previously. On 23rd January 
2013 ILVA stated that 65% of AIA prescriptions were already 
in place; that is in contrast with the level of remaining 
intervention costs and the related uncertainty arising. A 
further unclear aspect relates to the individual investment for 
each plant and sub-plant. For instance, for the coke areas, 
860 M€ is the cost estimated to refurbish and rebuild, even 
though in a document dated 2012 entitled “Investments for 
Environment”[9], the Company stated to have already 
invested since 1995 up to 2011, 480 M€. Surprisingly, after an 
investment of 30 M€ per year in a single area, the area now 
apparently needs to be completely rebuilt.Other estimations 
are opaque and difficult to practically correlate to effective 
investments in industrial sustainability; the most probable 
value could be around 689 M€ in a period spanning from 
1995 to 2006.  
Considering the investments from the Government and tax 
payers’perspective, it appears that assuring job protection of 
more than 5,000 workers up to 2015 will result in a collective 
cost of more than 800 M€ to the public purse. Surely it would 
be better to oblige privately owned companies to respect 
regulations adopting the required investments (even if this 
means partially supporting them from public sources) before 
reaching this critical disequilibrium point, instead of imposing 
almost entirely, the huge social, economic, and environmental 
(and hence serious health issues) on the country and citizens, 
and finally claiming for the evident “unsustainability” of these 
industrial practices/facilities. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The hard choice to risk dying of cancer rather than face the 
ignominy and hardship of unemployment for workers, the 
institutional obligations to prohibit environmental pollutionto 
guarantee health and wellbeing for the citizens of the territory, 
and the conflictingmyopic profit-oriented management 
strategy of Riva Group, pose an unquestionable industrial 
sustainability challenge. The Riva group has claimed that 
compliance costs were prohibitive. However, looking at the 
economic and financial performance of Riva Group, it is hard 
to acceptthey couldn’t support the right investments to 
renovate the plant since 1995, and yet harder to believe they 
are now demanding the government to pay. 
Some commentators have suggested that inappropriate 
ownership of the company, prolonged State inaction, and 
corruption are the cause of the problems. There is almost 
certainly some truth in this as evidenced by the fact that 
polluting activities have continuedsince the 1990’s despite 
environmental concerns raised by government, and award of 
full environmental certifications ISO14001 and ISO18001 right 
up to the current date. However, ultimately it appears that the 
Riva family and the management of ILVA have simply 
followed a  contemporary shareholder-centric approach to 
business of profit maximisation, with an expectation that 
government will continue to support by taking responsibility 
forthe external social and environmental costs[10]. 
The ILVA Taranto case isan extreme example of 
environmental pollution and social harm due the size of the 
plant, its national and regional importance, and the duration of 
the problems, but the problematic business approach 
underlying the issues is not uncommon. Recent, highly public 
examples demonstrate similar compromises in pursuit of 
profitsacross a broad range of sectors. For example, British 
Petroleum’s environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010; suicides and labour disputes over pay and working 
conditions at iphone supplier Foxconn in China 2010-2012, 
and the collapse of an apparel factory building in Bangladesh 
in 2013 killing many hundreds of workers.Similar scenarios 
are likely to occur repeatedlyparticularly in regions where 
regulations and governance to protect the environment and 
society are weakuntil business models focused on short-term 
profit maximisation are addressed. This is perhaps particularly 
pertinent to large nationally strategic industry sectors.  
In the past these enterprises may have benefited from implicit 
guarantees of the State, enabling them to maximise short-
term profits for management and owners while acting in 
areckless manner towards their broader stakeholders 
including the environment, workers and society. The judicial 
challenge in this particular case of ILVA demonstrates that the 
changing dynamics of a recessionary and debt-laden Europe 
makes such an expectation of government and taxpayer 
largesse look increasingly unsustainable.Furthermore, 
pressure on firms to adopt a more holistic approach to 
business sustainability seems likely to increase under 
changing public awareness and attitudes towards the role of 
corporations in the wake of the recent examples of corporate 
neglect of suppliers and the environment in pursuit of profits.  
Applying a scientific and rigorous industrial sustainability 
approach will be the only way to resolve paradoxes like the 
one presented in this case; production (even of steel) is 
possible in a way that guarantees workers and community 
health and wellbeing. Technology can provide effective 
solutions as defined in BRefs and demonstrated by leading 
producers in Germany, South Korea and Japan who have 
pioneered and championed best available techniques for the 
sector. Such firms, far from being weakened by the 
investment costs are now enjoying strong competitive 
advantages in a global market place, supporting, rather than 
damaging their local environment and communities. Such 
innovation is more than just technological though – it requires 
a fundamental shift in perception of the value proposition of 
the firm to embrace the needs of broader stakeholder groups, 
reducethe dependency on government support and fully 
reconsider how the firm does business, whichare at the core 
of the firm’s business model. 
In conclusion, appropriate consideration of social and 
environmental sustainability within the business model as 
suggested by Stubbs and Cocklin[1]will therefore increasingly 
become core to ensuring economic sustainability and hence 
long-term survivability of the firm and protection of national 
strategic capabilities and jobs. Firms and government policy 
will need to shift to a more holistic perspective of value 
creation, based on the TBL and BATs. 
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